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Abstract: We analyze the role of imperfect competition in explaining the relationship between tem-
porary surges in trade-volumes and the level of cooperation in trade policy that can be sustained
between countries in a repeated game framework. Imperfectly competitive markets are characterized
by a mark-up which is the wedge between equilibrium price and the marginal cost of production.
Absent domestic policy tools, gains from protectionist policies are shown to depend positively on the
size of the mark-up in the domestic import-competing sector, which is in addition to the conventional
terms-of-trade related beneﬁts. A temporary surge in trade-volume due to a supply-side shock lowers
the industry mark-up making protectionist policies less desirable. This counters the increase in the
terms-of-trade related beneﬁts due to higher trade-volume. The net eﬀect of these two competing
forces determines whether periods of abnormally high trade-volumes feature more or less coopera-
tion along the equilibrium path of the repeated game. We identify simple conditions distinguishing
between these two outcomes thereby establishing the pattern of “managed trade” under imperfect
competition. A sharp distinction is drawn between demand side and supply side shocks. We suggest
a simple generalization of the results to other forms of distortions.
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Two central issues in the literature on trade policy are the potential gains from inter-
national trade agreements and how such agreements can be enforced. A simple explanation
of the beneﬁts from trade agreements is that the pursuit of unilateral interest in the setting
of trade policy by a country leads to welfare losses through reduced market access for the
partner country. Since the country in question which imposes trade restrictions does not bear
this cost, it is tempted to supply protection beyond the globally eﬃcient level. A “Prisoner’s
Dilemma” type situation emerges when all countries pursue this beggar-thy-neighbor policy.
Trade agreements are beneﬁcial in that they can help unlock these externalities by moving
the countries from the ineﬃcient high levels of protection to globally eﬃcient ones (Bagwell
and Staiger, 1999, 2002). A second rationale for trade agreements is that, when a govern-
ment lacks credibility vis-a-vis its domestic private agents, then the time-consistent policy is
sub-optimal. An ex ante commitment through a trade agreement can be welfare improving
by enhancing the government’s credibility (Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare, 1998). However,
whether the economic beneﬁts of international trade agreements stem from their potential
to limit the temptation to pursue beggar-thy-neighbor trade policies or their potential to
enhance the government’s credibility, the temptation for unilateral trade policy choices does
not go away once an agreement is in place (Staiger, 1995, p. 1519). Thus, it is imperative
to consider precisely what kind of agreements can be enforced in relation to the underlying
economic environment. The present paper attempts to shed light on this by focusing on the
enforcement issue when markets are imperfectly competitive and countries are tempted to
follow beggar-thy-neighbor policies in the sense mentioned above.
1A prior question that we need to consider is the mechanism through which trade agree-
ments are to be enforced. Since countries trade repeatedly over time, a natural possibility
is to use the threat of future punishment to deter violations of trade agreements. A cred-
ible threat of future punishment can sustain a more liberal trading environment than that
predicted under the static Nash equilibrium (Bagwell and Staiger, 1990; Dixit 1987b; Jensen
and Thursby, 1984). While most of the work in this area helps explain how the temptation
for unilateral policies can be curtailed, a notable feature of Bagwell and Staiger is that it
explains how the achieved level of cooperation varies in a changing environment. Speciﬁcally,
in a perfectly competitive partial equilibrium framework, they show that the potentially ex-
ploitable terms-of-trade related gains are higher during periods of high trade-volumes so that
in such periods the country has greater incentive to deviate from an initial tariﬀ agreement.
An immediate outcome of this is that if the surge in trade-volume is suﬃciently high then
cooperative tariﬀs need to be raised to keep the unilateral incentive to deviate in check.
Thus, the model predicts low baseline tariﬀs during normal periods with “special” (high)
protection during periods of high trade-volumes. Bagwell and Staiger refer to this dynamic
structure of achieved level of cooperation as “managed trade”.
The present paper builds on this work by analyzing the impact of imperfect competi-
tion on the dynamic structure of sustainable cooperation; that is, the pattern of managed
trade under imperfect competition. We consider a simple partial equilibrium model with
two symmetric countries. Each country produces an import-competing and an exportable
good under imperfect competition in addition to a common numeraire good which is pro-
duced under perfect competition. Markets for the non-numeraire goods are segmented by
2construction of the model. To motivate the basic arguments, consider the case when an
import tariﬀ is the only policy instrument available. A strictly positive tariﬀ imposed by, for
example, the home country, leads to the conventional terms-of-trade related gains for it and
a tt h es a m et i m ei n c r e a s e si t sp r o d u c t i o no ft h e importable. This larger production of the
importable increases home’s welfare through a ﬁrst order eﬀect since production in the sector
is distorted to begin with. Speciﬁcally, a unit increase in the output of the import-competing
sector increases home’s welfare, when evaluated at the margin and at the original world and
local prices, by an amount equal to the diﬀerence between the equilibrium local price and
the marginal cost of production which is the industry “mark-up”.1 This source of beneﬁt
from protection is completely absent when markets are perfectly competitive since allocation
of resources is then optimal.2 This point is well-known in the literature.3 Thus, it is
simple to see from this that the beneﬁt from protectionism and thus, the pattern of managed
trade will be governed by the dynamics of the mark-ups and the terms-of-trade related gains.
Now consider an abnormal period in the sense of Bagwell and Staiger featuring a temporary
surge in import-volume due to a supply side shock which can be either a higher marginal
cost of production of the importable in home or a lower cost of production of home’s im-
portable in the foreign country. With tariﬀsh e l dﬁx e dm o m e n t a r i l y ,s u c hs h o c k sl e a dt o
lower equilibrium mark-up in home’s import-competing sector implying a lower incentive to
deviate (the mark-up eﬀect). Of course, the terms-of-trade related gains will be larger due to
1 Or, more precisely, the “price-marginal cost mark-up”.
2 We are assuming here that the ﬁrst-best policy tool, domestic production subsidy to the imperfectly
competitive sectors, is unavailable to the governments so that the use of tariﬀs, and trade restrictions in
general, to correct for this distortion is, as described in the literature, a “second-best” argument.
3 See, for example, Flam and Helpman (1987). We discuss this point in more detail in the sections that
follow.
3larger import-volume which will increase the incentive to deviate (the terms-of-trade eﬀect).
Overall, the incentive to deviate will fall if and only if the mark-up eﬀect is stronger than
the terms-of-trade eﬀect. When this happens then we get a simple theory of managed trade
with greater cooperation (lower tariﬀs) precisely in periods of high trade-volumes. This is in
sharp contrast to the results in Bagwell and Staiger. It is simple to see from this that when
the surge in import-volume is due to demand side shocks then the two eﬀects mentioned
above will be reinforcing producing a pattern of managed trade similar to the one in Bagwell
and Staiger. Thus, our results draw a sharp distinction between demand and supply side
shocks which has been completely neglected in the theoretical and empirical work.
The present paper builds on the theme mentioned above and seeks to identify conditions
that determine the qualitative aspects of the pattern of managed trade. Importantly, we
suggest a simple generalization of our results to other forms of imperfections common in the
literature.
The outline of the remaining paper is as follows. In section 1 we set up the basic model
and derive the static equilibrium and interpret its properties. In section 2 we introduce the
dynamic elements of the repeated game and derive the pattern of managed trade when tariﬀs
are the only policy tool available and there are cost-based shocks in the exportable sector of
each country. In section 3 we extend the basic ﬁndings of section 2 to supply side shocks in
the import-competing sectors, demand side shocks and, to the case when export policies are
also used. In the conclusion we summarize our ﬁndings and suggest a simple generalization
to other forms of imperfections.
4Section 1
1.1 Basic structure of the static game
We consider a model with two countries called home and foreign. There are three goods
labelled Z, X and Y . To keep the model simple, we assume that home-agents consume goods
Z and X while foreign-agents consume goods Z and Y . Utility function of a representative
home-agent is given by: Cz + αCx − βC2
x/2 where Cx(Cz) denotes his consumption level
of good X(Z); α,β are assumed to be strictly positive parameters and given exogenously.




y /2 where C∗
y(C∗
z) is the amount of good Y (Z) consumed by the agent.4 Without loss of
generality to our results, we normalize the total number (measure) of agents in each country
to unity.
We next introduce the price notations. Let Pz,P x denote the absolute prices of goods
Z,X, respectively, in home’s local market. Similarly, let P∗
z ,P ∗
y denote the local prices of
goods Z,Y, respectively, in foreign’s local market. For the rest of the model we will treat
good Z as the common numeraire good for both the countries. Thus, the relative price of




We assume that, at the beginning of each period, each country receives a ﬁxed endow-
ment of the numeraire good and none of the other goods. This endowment is either consumed
within the period or used to produce the non-numeraire goods. Assume that the endowment
is suﬃciently large so that good Z is always consumed in a strictly positive amount. We will
denote the cost of producing one unit of good X(Y ) i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r yb ycm(cn) and that
4 The symmetry of the utility function between the numeraire and the non-numeraire goods across the
t w oc o u n t r i e sh a sn ob e a r i n go no u rr e s u l t s .
5in the foreign country by cn(cm), as measured in terms of the numeraire good. Thus, cost-
structure in the two countries is symmetric in that home’s import-competing sector (sector
X) is symmetric to foreign’s (sector Y ).5 For tractability, subscript m(n) will always refer
to the import-competing (export) sectors of the two countries.
We next introduce the market structure. As in Brander and Krugman (1983), we assume
that, in each country, market for good Z is perfectly competitive while there is imperfect
competition in the non-numeraire good’s markets. Intuitively, we consider the situation
where there are a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms that possess the necessary technical know-how to
produce the non-numeraire goods. In the home country, there are m(n) number of ﬁrms that
can produce good X(Y ). To ensure symmetry of the type discussed above, we assume that in
the foreign country there are n(m) number of ﬁrms that produce good X(Y ).W ew i l lt r e a t
m,n as strictly positive integer values, given exogenously to the model. To keep the model
simple, we assume that the ownership of ﬁrms in the non-numeraire sectors is extremely
concentrated so that ﬁrms in these sectors maximize their proﬁts in the conventional sense.6
The solution concept used in the paper is the standard Cournot oligopoly solution with
quantity competition. The oligopolistic structure outlined above is similar to the one in Dixit
(1984) and Brander and Krugman.7
We now introduce trade policies. Throughout the paper we will assume that there is free
5 The cost structure can be alternatively derived from Ricardian technology with labor as the only factor
of production and constant input-ouput coeﬃcients equal to 1,c m,c n i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r yf o rg o o d sZ,X,Y
respectively. The corresponding coeﬃcients for the foreign are 1,c n,c m.
6 The assumption implies that the output decision of ﬁrms is independent of tariﬀ revenue considerations
and of the market prices that the owners of ﬁrms themselves face as consumers. For more details on this see,
for example, Grossman and Helpman (1994, pp. 846-847).
7 The oligopolistic structure of markets here over-simpliﬁes the complexity of imperfectly competitive
markets in the real world. However, we believe that it is a convenient way to highlight our main result regarding
the mark-up eﬀect discussed later in the paper which is likely to be preserved under richer environments.
6trade in the numeraire good which serves to balance trade between the two countries.8 For
trade in the non-numeraire goods, we allow for import tariﬀs and export subsidies. For home
we will denote these by t,e, respectively, with t being a non-negative speciﬁct a r i ﬀ and e the
per-unit subsidy which can be either positive or negative.9 For the foreign country, these
policy levels will be denoted by t∗,e ∗, respectively. Throughout the paper we will maintain
that the government in each country maximizes its (pure) national welfare. Tariﬀ revenue,
if any, is distributed back uniformly to the country’s consumers in a lump-sum fashion. The
same holds for the export-subsidy.10 Since the numeraire good does not play any active role
in our analysis, in the remainder of the paper “goods” and “sectors” will imply non-numeraire
goods and sectors.
This completes the basic structure of the static model. As will be clear from the solution
derived below, the markets for goods X,Y are segmented. This, coupled with the symmetric
nature of the model, simpliﬁes our algebra considerably and allows us to draw sharp results.
1.2 Solution of the static game
From the utility functions stated above we get that home’s (aggregate) inverse demand
function for good X is given by px = α−βXd, where Xd i st h ea m o u n to fg o o dX demanded
b ya l lo fh o m e ’ sc o n s u m e r s .
We will assume that the solution values are strictly interior in that all equilibrium prices,
output level of each good in each country and trade-volumes are strictly positive. Interior
8 Free trade in the numeraire good sector is frequently assumed in the literature. See, for example, Bagwell
and Staiger (1997, page 96, footnote 5); Brander and Krugman (1983).
9 Our motivation for ruling out negative tariﬀs is that they are rarely observed in the real world. However,
our results are qualitatively preserved even if these are allowed.
10 That is, when the export subsidy is negative then this is distributed back to the country’s agents in a
lump-sum fashion. When the subsidy is positive then the cost of this is met through a lump-sum transfer
from the private agents to its government.
7solution conditions are speciﬁed later which ensure this result.11
To derive equilibrium prices and production levels we need to specify the best response
functions of the ﬁrms. To this end, treat all policy variables as exogenously ﬁxed at arbitrary
levels. Proﬁto ft h eith home-ﬁrm in sector X is equal to [α − β(xi + X−i) − cm]xi where
xi is the output of the ﬁrm and X−i is the aggregate output of all the remaining (home
and foreign) ﬁrms in the sector. The best response output of the ﬁrm is equal to xi(X−i) ≡
(α − βX−i − cm)/2β. Similarly, proﬁto ft h ejth foreign-ﬁrm in sector X producing output
level x∗
j is equal to [α − β(x∗
j + X−j) − cn + e∗ − t]x∗
j where X−j is the aggregate output of
all the other ﬁrms in the sector. The best response output of the ﬁrm is equal to x∗
j(X−j) ≡
(α − βX−j − cn + e∗ − t)/2β. We now impose an additional symmetry assumption that all
home-ﬁrms produce an equal level of output in equilibrium. A similar assumption holds
for all the foreign-ﬁrms in the sector. The assumption is natural since all home-ﬁrms in
the sector are identical. The same holds for the foreign-ﬁrms. With this in place we get
that the aggregate equilibrium output of foreign-ﬁrms in sector X which is home’s total
import-volume is equal to12
V = V (V f,t,e ∗) ≡ V f −
n(1 + m)(t − e∗)
β(1 + m + n)
V f ≡
n[α + mcm − (1 + m)cn]
β(1 + m + n)
where V f is home’s import-volume under complete free trade in good X; that is, when t,e∗
are each equal to zero.
11 These are stated in Assumption A1 in section 2.
12 It can be easily checked that the suﬃciency conditions of Hahn (1962) for the stability of the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium are satisﬁed due to the linearity of the aggregate demand function.




β(1 + m + n)
where Xf
m is home’s production of the importable with t,e∗ equal to zero.13
Total world output and home’s consumption of good X will be denoted by X ≡ V + Xm.
Equilibrium (relative) price of good X in home’s local market will be denote by px and
its value is equal to α − βX where X is as in the previous identity.14 Using the linkage
condition, we get the (untaxed) world price of good X, deﬁned from home’s point of view,
as equal to px − t ≡ pw
x. Computing we get
pw
x =





Solution values of the variables for the foreign country can be obtained symmetrically.
That is, let V ∗,Y∗,p ∗
y denote the equilibrium values of foreign’s total import volume, total
consumption of good Y, local price of Y (in foreign’s market), respectively. Values of these
variables are exactly the same as for V,X,px, respectively, with t replaced by t∗ and, e∗ by
e. The same substitution of policy variables in the expression for Xm gives the aggregate
equilibrium output of foreign-ﬁrms producing good Y and this will be denoted by Y ∗
m. To
complete the solution, we deﬁne p∗w
y as the world price of good Y from foreign’s point of
view. That is, p∗w
y = p∗
y − t∗. I t ’ sv a l u ei sg i v e nb yt h es a m ee q u a t i o na sf o rpw
x above with
e∗,treplaced by e,t∗, respectively.
An important feature of imperfectly competitive markets is that sectoral allocation of
13 Expression for X
f
m is stated in Appendix A1.
14 Expression for px is stated in Appendix A1.
9resources may not be eﬃcient. To capture this, we ﬁrst introduce the industry mark-ups
relevant to our model.
The mark-up in home’s import-competing sector is simply the diﬀerence between the
equilibrium price of good X in home’s local market and home’s marginal cost of producing
the good. Formally, we will denote this by µx ≡ px − cm. Computing we get
µx = µx(µf,t,e ∗) ≡ µf +
n(t − e∗)
1+m + n
µf = µf(V f,c m,α) ≡
α − cm − βV f
1+m
where µf is the value of home’s mark-up in the sector with t,e∗ equal to zero.
For the foreign country, we will denote its mark-up in its import-competing sector (sector
Y ) by µ∗
y ≡ p∗
y −cm. We note here that the solution for this is symmetric to home’s; that is,
µ∗
y = µx(µf,t ∗,e). For tractability, we will use V ∗f,µ ∗f to denote foreign’s import-volume
and mark-up, respectively, when t∗,eare each equal to zero.15
From the solution cited above we note our ﬁrst Lemma which will be useful in later
sections.
Lemma 1
With all policy variables held ﬁxed in home and foreign, we have that:
(i) An outward shift in home’s demand for its importable good increases its equilibrium
import-volume and the mark-up. That is, ∂V/∂α > 0 and ∂µx/∂α > 0. Similarly, for the
foreign country, ∂V ∗/∂α > 0 and ∂µ∗
y/∂α > 0.





10(ii) A supply side shock in sector X in either the home country or the foreign country
changes home’s import-volume and mark-up in opposite directions. That is, ∂V/∂cm > 0
while ∂µx/∂cm < 0. Similarly, ∂V/∂cn < 0 while ∂µx/∂cn > 0.16 By symmetry, the same
results hold for V ∗ and µ∗
y.
Lemma 1 is useful in that it provides an intermediate step in establishing the relationship
between periodic shocks in demand and supply conditions (values of α,c m,c n) and each
country’s beneﬁt from cooperation relative to deviation. This will be critical in the sections
that follow where we consider how a country’s incentive to deviate from a proposed tariﬀ
agreement varies with ﬂuctuations in its underlying trade-volume and mark-up.
1.3 Welfare functions
From the solution above we can easily compute home’s national welfare which will be
denoted by W. We have that
W = W(V f,µ f,c m,c n,α,t,e,t ∗,e ∗)
≡ (β/2)X2 + tV + µxXm +( p∗
y − cn − t∗)V ∗
The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side (RHS) of the identity is home’s (consumer) surplus from
the consumption of good X, the second term is its total tariﬀ revenue, the third term is home’s
producer surplus in sector X and, the last term is its producer surplus from production and
export of good Y net of export subsidy. Foreign’s welfare is symmetric to home’s and will
be denoted by W∗ ≡ W(V f,µ f,c m,c n,α,t ∗,e ∗,t,e).
This completes the basic solution of the static game. Since the solution is symmetric
across countries, the rest of the results will be developed from home’s point of view and will
16 The partial derivatives throughout the Lemma indicate that all policy variables are treated as ﬁxed.
11apply to foreign in a symmetric way.
Section 2: Import tariﬀs
In this section we consider the case when import tariﬀ is the only policy tool available.
Our motivation for focusing on this case ﬁrst is that it broadly reﬂects the real-world situation
and also that it allows us to compare our results with the ones in the literature where import
tariﬀ is often assumed to be the only policy instrument. Thus, for the remainder of this
section we set e,e∗ equal to zero.
2.1 Static Nash equilibrium tariﬀs
Home’s marginal beneﬁtf r o mi t st a r i ﬀ can be expressed as
∂W/∂t = W0(V f,µ f,t)=−V ∂pw
x/∂t + t∂V/∂t + µx∂Xm/∂t .....(1)
In the previous equation, the ﬁrst two terms together capture home’s conventional terms-of-
trade related beneﬁt net of consumption and production distortion of the tariﬀ.T h et h i r d
term relates to imperfect competition. In particular, a unit increase in home’s tariﬀ increases
it’s production of the importable by an amount equal to ∂Xm/∂t>0 and lowers that of the
numeraire good. Under perfect competition, such re-allocation of production has a second
order eﬀect only on its welfare since the allocation of resources is optimal to begin with
(price equals marginal cost so that µx =0 ). However, with imperfect competition in the
sector, equilibrium price is strictly higher than the marginal cost (µx > 0) so that a unit
increase in the production of the good increases home’s welfare by a ﬁrst order eﬀect which,
at the margin, is equal to µx. Thus, we interpret home’s mark-up simply as the size of the
12distortion in the allocation of resources due to imperfect competition.17 This point is well-
known in the literature and is also referred to as the “own output pro-competitive eﬀect.”
For example, Flam and Helpman (1987, p. 90) note that:
“The point is that whenever price exceeds marginal production costs, there is a
welfare gain to be made from output expansion. The larger the diﬀerence between
price and marginal costs, the larger the gain per unit of additional output.”18
We would like to point out here that this source of welfare improvement does not reﬂect
the “strategic beneﬁt” from protection. A simple way to see this is to note that the term
µx∂Xm/∂t is evaluated at the original prices and arises because of the change in home-ﬁrms’
own output. The strategic beneﬁt as, for example, in Brander-Spencer models, arises purely
from the price movement resulting from the change in the output of the rival (foreign) ﬁrms.
Further, it is also diﬀerent from the beneﬁt from protection suggested in the literature on
trade policy under monopolistic competition and increasing return to scale. Studies in this
area reveal additional sources of gains from protection such as the exercise of monopoly
power in the foreign market even for a small economy due to diﬀerentiated products (Gros
1987), achieving the optimal number of varieties produced domestically and imported (Ven-
ables,1982; Flam and Helpman) and realizing greater economies of scale.19
17 By symmetry, a similar interpretation holds for foreign’s mark-up, µ
∗
y.
18 There is a wide body of empirical evidence on the signiﬁcance of price-marginal cost mark-ups and their
relationship to import penetration ratios, import-tariﬀs and other trade barriers. For example, Levinsohn
(1993) ﬁnds that the large scale removal of import protection in the Turkish manufacturing sector in 1984 led
to a signiﬁcant decline in the price-cost mark-ups in these sectors. For a literature survey on this area see,
for example, Feenstra (1995).
19 Gros explicitly notes that his optimal tariﬀ “does not correct a domestic distortion”. Also, with increasing
returns to scale, a positive tariﬀ may be beneﬁcial to a small country as it expands domestic production of
t h ei m p o r t a b l et h u sl o w e r i n gt h ea v e r a g eﬁxed cost. This eﬀect is completely absent in our model.
13From equation (1) it is evident that home’s tariﬀ has no eﬀect on the producer surplus
in its export sector and also that W0(.) is independent of foreign’s tariﬀ. Both these results
follow from the fact that markets for X,Y are completely segmented.
It will be useful to rewrite equation (1) in terms of V f,µ f. Doing this we have that
W0(V f,µ f,t)=




β(1 + m + n)
−
n[n +2 ( 1+m)2]
β(1 + m + n)2 t .....(2)
We set W0(.)=0and solve for home’s interior best response tariﬀ. Let this be denoted
by tn.20 From the previous equation it can be seen that tn is well deﬁned, unique, strictly
positive and independent of the tariﬀ set by the foreign country. From equation (2) it is
evident that tn is strictly increasing in V f,µ f and it is also home’s optimal and the static
Nash equilibrium tariﬀ. The exact value of tn is stated in Appendix A1. It can be easily
checked that W(.) is globally strictly concave in t so that the second order maximization
condition is satisﬁed.
We now impose our interior solution condition which is as follows.
Assumption A1: α >m a x {cm,c n} and cm >c n.
The ﬁrst inequality in Assumption A1 is standard in the literature and it ensures that
the equilibrium output level (absent any policy intervention) of all ﬁrms and equilibrium
prices are strictly positive. The second part of the assumption, cm >c n, is a simplifying
assumption which implies that: (i) tn is non-prohibitive21 and, (ii) free trade maximizes the
static joint welfare (W + W∗ value) of the two countries. In section 3.3 we put forward a
weaker set of assumptions allowing cm to be less than cn and argue that our main results are
20 By symmetry, the best response tariﬀ of the foreign country is also equal to tn.
21 Prohibitive tariﬀ of each country when tariﬀs alone are used is equal to tR ≡ β(1+m+n)V
f/n(1+m).
14virtually unchanged.
We note that the solution values of all the endogenous variables are strictly interior for
all t,t∗ ∈ [0,t n].
2.2 Global eﬃciency and gains from cooperation
We deﬁne global eﬃciency as the situation where the static joint welfare of the two
countries, W + W∗, is maximized in each time period. This approach is common in the
literature and natural for our case since the two countries are symmetric.22
With cm >c n, global eﬃciency is achieved if and only if free trade is implemented in
each time period. A formal proof of this is given in Appendix A2. The intuition for this
is simple. Starting at free trade, a strictly positive tariﬀ by home shifts production from
the eﬃcient foreign-ﬁrms to ineﬃcient home-ﬁrms producing good X which lowers world
welfare. Also, the total world production of good X falls which lowers world welfare further
since local price of good X and hence its marginal utility is strictly higher than the marginal
cost of production in the two countries. Thus, symmetrically lowering home’s and foreign’s
tariﬀ from the static Nash equilibrium level towards zero increases the welfare of both the
countries.
The intuition for gains from cooperation can be noted from the structure of externalities
across countries from unilateral policies which is captured in the next equation:
∂W∗/∂t = −V (−∂pw
x/∂t)+( pw
x − cn)∂V/∂t
The partial derivatives here indicate that foreign’s tariﬀ is held ﬁxed. RHS of the previous
equation is simply the loss in the producer surplus to foreign-exporters from home’s tariﬀ
22 See Bagwell and Staiger (1990) for a similar approach.
15when evaluated at the margin. The ﬁrst term is the loss due to the adverse price movement
while the second one is the loss due to reduction in the production of foreign’s exportable
and it strictly positive since, due to imperfect competition, pw
x >c n so that output changes
have a ﬁrst order eﬀect on total producer surplus and hence, national welfare, as discussed
above.
With the above discussion in place, we now seek to explain how the Pareto gains from
cooperation discussed above can be realized. To this end, we extend the model to allow
for repeated interaction. In particular, we seek to explore how repeated interaction enables
countries to lower protection from the levels that would prevail in the static environment.
The relationship between import-volume and the achieved protection levels will be of special
interest here.
To incorporate the dynamic elements we make two departures from the static model
above. That is, we assume that the static model is repeated inﬁnitely and that there are
periodic shocks of the kind discussed in the following paragraph.
In this section we focus on symmetric shocks in each country’s exportable good’s sector.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that, at the beginning of each period, “nature” assigns a non-negative
value to cn which is the unit and marginal cost of producing the exportable good for home
and foreign. Let F(cn) denote the distribution function of cn over the support [c
¯
n,¯ cn], 0 ≤
c
¯
n < ¯ cn where c
¯
n,¯ cn satisfy Assumption A1. We assume that F(.) is well deﬁned, continuous,
diﬀerentiable upto the necessary order and stationary over time so that cn is independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across time periods. As stated above, each country seeks
16to maximize its national welfare in each period.23
We next introduce the two basic elements of repeated interaction: the “incentive to
deviate” and the “threat of future punishment”.
2.3 Deviation payoﬀs
Given the symmetric nature of the model, it is natural to focus on symmetric cooperative
tariﬀs. That is, the cooperative agreement speciﬁe st h es a m et a r i ﬀ for each country which
will be denoted by tc = tc(cn). Our ﬁnal solution will feature tc <t n and hence we will
restrict our discussion to this case. We may also note that with i.i.d. shocks our model
is stationary across time periods so that in any subgame perfect equilibria of the repeated
g a m ew eh a v et h es a m et a r i ﬀ function, tc(cn), implemented in each time period. With this
holding, we omit the time-period notations.24
Home’s incentive to deviate is given by its (static) deviation payoﬀ which is the change
in its welfare when it (optimally) deviates from tc to tn and foreign’s tariﬀ is held ﬁxed at
tc. This is equal to
Ω(V f,µ f,t c) ≡
R tn
tc W0(V f,µ f,t)dt .....(3)
where W0(.) is as in equation (2).
The explicit expression of Ω(V f,µ f,t c) is stated in Appendix A1 from which it can
be checked that it is strictly decreasing and convex in tc over the interval [0,t n). Further,
Ω(V f,µ f,t n)=0and the derivative of Ω(.) with respect to tc at tc = tn is equal to zero.25
23 As in Bagwell and Staiger (1990), countries are not concerned with risk sharing in this setting since
marginal utility of national income is unaﬀected by the shocks here and elsewhere in the paper. For more
details on this point, see, Bagwell and Staiger, p. 781, footnote 6.
24 For a similar result, see, for example, Bagwell and Staiger (1990).
25 See Appendix A1 for more details on this point.
17The dynamics of the deviation payoﬀ with respect to cn can be derived from the identity






x/∂t)dV f/dcn +( ∂Xm/∂t)dµf/dcn dt ...(4)
The integrand in (4) is simply ∂W0(V f,µ f,t)/∂cn which captures the shift in home’s marginal
beneﬁt function from protection due to a change in cn.26 The ﬁrst term of the integrand
deﬁnes our terms-of-trade eﬀect and the second term deﬁnes the mark-up eﬀect, as discussed
in the introduction. Speciﬁcally, with all tariﬀsh e l dﬁxed, a lower value of cn leads to a surge
in home’s import-volume (∂V/∂cn = dV f/dcn < 0 as stated in Lemma 1) which increases
home’s marginal beneﬁt from protection and thus, its deviation payoﬀ, for terms-of-trade
related gains net of consumption and production distortion of the tariﬀ.N e x tw en o t et h a t
the stated change in cn also lowers home’s equilibrium mark-up (∂µx/∂cn = dµf/dcn > 0
as in Lemma 1). With a lower mark-up, home’s marginal beneﬁt from protection and thus,
its deviation payoﬀ, falls. This constitutes the mark-up eﬀect with respect to cn and is
captured by the second term of the integrand in (4). The direction of the overall change in
the deviation payoﬀ depends on the relative strengths of these two competing eﬀects. It is
important to note here that the change in the mark-up described here is completely driven
by the underlying change in home’s import volume. That is, changes in cn aﬀect the value of
µf through the implied change in V f only. This makes our results directly comparable to the
ones in Bagwell and Staiger which are also completely driven by changes in trade-volumes.
Substituting for the terms in (4) we get that the mark-up eﬀect dominates the terms-
26 The partial derivative of W
0(.) with respect to cn here implies that all tariﬀsa r eh e l dﬁxed.
18of-trade eﬀect in absolute value so that dΩ(.)/dcn > 0 if and only if n>(m +1 ) 2/m. This
situation yields a negative relationship between temporary surges in trade-volumes and the
incentive to deviate.27 The interpretation of previous inequality is simple. Holding m ﬁxed,
as n rises home’s market power in trade (−∂pw
x/∂t) becomes smaller and approaches zero
in the limit. Beneﬁt to home from protectionist policy is then simply the expansion of its
import-competing sector due to the positive mark-up. Thus, the mark-up eﬀect dominates
the terms-of-trade eﬀect at suﬃciently large values of n. T h eo p p o s i t eh o l d sw h e nm rises
for any ﬁxed n. In this case, home’s market power rises and approaches one in the limit.
Simultaneously, its mark-up value approaches zero and becomes invariant to its tariﬀ.T h u s ,
the terms-of-trade eﬀect is the dominant eﬀect here.
Summarizing, we have shown above that a surge in import-volume stemming from a
lower cn can either increase or decrease the incentive to deviate depending upon the relative
strength of the two eﬀects described above. We may infer from this that when the mark-up
eﬀect dominates then the incentive to deviate is smaller in periods of high import-volumes
so that more liberal trade policy (lower tariﬀs) can be sustained in equilibrium.
2.4 Threat of future punishment
The threat of future punishment which sustains cooperation between countries is given
by the present discounted value of the expected loss in welfare from a trade war relative to
cooperation. This is equal to
ω = ω(tc) ≡ (δ/(1 − δ))E[W(.,cn,t c,t c) − W(.,cn,t n,t n)]
27 We note that the deviation payoﬀ of the foreign country is also given by the same Ω(.) function so that






{(1 + m)2 + nm}βV f − nm(α − cm)





2β(1 + m + n)2
#
....(5)
where E is the expectations operator over cn and, δ ∈ (0,1), is the common discount rate
of each country. It is direct to verify that the ﬁrst term inside the square bracket is strictly
positive with tc <t n and ω(tc = tn)=0 . Since cn is i.i.d. across time periods, ω is
independent of the current value of cn as well as tc. The function tc(cn) will aﬀect ω, however,
since the function’s distributional characteristics inﬂuence the expected values in ω(.).
2.4 Existence of the solution value of tc
A cooperative tariﬀ function, tc(cn), can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium
of the game if and only if
Ω(V f,µ f,t c) ≤ ω(tc), ∀cn ......(6)
The inequality in (6) is the usual “no defection” condition or the “enforcement con-
straint”. The subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game is simply the tariﬀ function
that maximizes W +W∗ subject to the constraint in (6). To prove the existence of a unique
solution, we adopt the following procedure. Take any arbitrary and non-negative value of
ω(.), ¯ ω, and treat it as ﬁxed initially. Now solve for the minimum value of tc from (6).
This is given by tc(cn, ¯ ω)=max{0,t n −
p
¯ ω/θ}, θ ≡
n[n +2 ( 1+m)2]
2β(1 + m + n)2 . Using equation (5)
we now compute ω(tc(cn, ¯ ω)) ≡ ˜ ω(¯ ω). Existence of a solution is proved by showing that
∃¯ ω such that ˜ ω(¯ ω)=¯ ω. Using this ﬁxed point solution value of ¯ ω, we get the equilib-
rium tariﬀ function as tc(cn, ¯ ω). When multiple solutions exist we pick the highest value
of ¯ ω that satisﬁes the previous equality. It is trivial to note ˜ ω(0) = 0. This constitutes
one solution with each country playing its static Nash equilibrium tariﬀ in each period.
20However, we seek to explore if higher solution values of ¯ ω exist so that tc(cn) <t n for at
least some values of cn. To this end, deﬁne the set B(¯ ω) ⊆ [c
¯
,¯ c] such that cn ∈ B(¯ ω) ⇔
(mn − (1 + m)2)cn




(1 + 2m)α + m(m − n)cm
n +2 ( 1+m)2 . From the tc(cn, ¯ ω) function it is
direct to verify that tc(cn, ¯ ω)=0⇔ cn ∈ B(¯ ω) and strictly positive otherwise. We may
note here that B(¯ ω) may be empty (null set) for some values of ¯ ω. Let Bc(¯ ω) denote the
complement of B(¯ ω). With this in place we get ˜ ω(¯ ω) as:
˜ ω(¯ ω)=
δ[(1 + m)2 + mn]




























¯ ω/θ − ¯ ω/θ]dF
#
....(7)
The ﬁrst square bracket on RHS of equation (7) gives us E(V f(tn−tc)), the second one
is E(tn − tc) a n dt h et h i r do n ei sE(t2
n − t2
c).28 It can be checked that ˜ ω(¯ ω) > 0 ∀¯ ω > 0.
(a) Consider ﬁrst the case when ∀¯ ω ≥ max θt2
n ≡ ¯ ω1, where the maxima is taken over
cn. With this holding, we have that tc(cn, ¯ ω)=0and that B(¯ ω)=[ c
¯
,¯ c],B c(¯ ω)=∅.
Substituting these values in equation (7) we get the value of ˜ ω(¯ ω) which is independent of
¯ ω, strictly increasing in δ, approaches zero as δ tends to zero, and is arbitrarily large as δ
approaches 1. These properties imply that ∀¯ ω ≥ max θt2
n, we can ﬁnd a unique value of
δ such that ˜ ω(¯ ω)=¯ ω. Since LHS of the previous equation is increasing in δ and its RHS
is increasing in ¯ ω, w eg e tt h a tm i n i m u mv a l u eo fδ, say δ1, required here is given by the
28 From the deﬁnition of B(¯ ω) it is direct to verify that when ¯ ω =0then B(¯ ω) is a null set and thus
˜ ω(0) = 0 as stated above.
21condition that ˜ ω(¯ ω1)=¯ ω1. Thus, we have proved the existence of a unique solution with
tc =0when δ ≥ δ1, or equivalently, when the ﬁxed point solution satisﬁes the condition that
¯ ω ≥ max θt2
n.
(b) Now consider the remaining case when δ < δ1. As stated above, this implies that ˜ ω(¯ ω1) <
¯ ω1 and thus ˜ ω(¯ ω) < ¯ ω, ∀¯ ω ≤ ¯ ω1. We have already stated above that tn > 0 ∀cn which implies
that ∃¯ ω =¯ ω2 such that ∀¯ ω ≤ ¯ ω2,t c(cn, ¯ ω) > 0 ∀cn and Bc(¯ ω)=[ c
¯
,¯ c],B (¯ ω)=∅. Substituting
these restrictions in equation (6) it is simple to note that with primes denoting derivatives,
ω0(0) = ∞ and ˜ ω00(¯ ω) < 0 for all ¯ ω ≤ ¯ ω2. These properties imply that ∃¯ ω =¯ ω3,w i t h
0 < ¯ ω3 ≤ ¯ ω2 such that ˜ ω(¯ ω3) > ¯ ω3. The existence of a ﬁxed point then follows from the
previous inequality, ˜ ω(¯ ω1) < ¯ ω1 as stated above, and the fact that ˜ ω(¯ ω) is continuous in ¯ ω.
With some tedious algebra it can be checked that ˜ ω00(¯ ω) < 0 ∀¯ ω < ¯ ω1 and zero otherwise
so that the strictly interior ﬁxed point solution derived here is unique.29 It is direct to
verify that in this case (δ < δ1) we have that tc(cn) > 0 over an interval of values of cn. This
completes the existence proof.
2.5 Dynamic pattern of cooperation
The pattern of managed trade can now be easily derived. Consider the case when δ < δ1
and let ˆ ω denote the ﬁxed point solution as stated in the previous sub-section. We have noted
above that with δ < δ1 free trade is not subgame perfect in all states of the world (values of
cn). From the solution above it is evident that in this case there exists an interval of values
of cn over which the no-defection condition is binding. Pick any two values of cn from this
interval, say, c1n and c2n with c1n <c 2n.W eh a v et h a ttc(cin)=tn(cin)−
p
ˆ ω/θ for i =1 ,2,
29 This (unique) interior solution is in addition to the corner solution noted above where ω =0and
tc(cn)=tn.
22where tn(cin) is the value of tn when cn = cin. Noting that ˆ ω is independent of the current
realization of cn (that is, independent of c1n,c 2n) and θ, by deﬁnition, is independent of cn,
it follows that tc(c1n) <t c(c2n) if and only if tn(c1n) <t n(c2n). From the solution value of tn
in the Appendix it is direct to verify that the previous two inequalities will hold if and only if
n>(1+m)2/m. From Lemma 1w ea l r e a d yk n o wt h a tc1n <c 2n ⇒ V f(.,c1n) >Vf(.,c2n).30
This gives us our main result in the section that while a lower value of cn leads to a surge in
underlying trade-volume, however, it also leads to lower tariﬀ along the equilibrium path of
the dynamic game provided that δ is suﬃciently small so that the no-defection condition is
binding and that n>(1 + m)2/m.31
The intuition for the result can be easily discussed in terms of the terms-of-trade eﬀect
and mark-up eﬀect described above. Brieﬂy, with tariﬀsh e l dﬁxed, a lower value of cn leads
to a surge in each country’s import-volume. Through the mark-up eﬀect this surge lowers the
incentive to deviate while the terms-of-trade eﬀect counters this by increasing the deviation
payoﬀ. The net eﬀect of these two is to lower the deviation payoﬀ if and only if the previous
inequality holds. When this is the case and the no-defection condition is binding so that
the equilibrium tariﬀs are sensitive to the movement in the deviation payoﬀ,t h e nw eg e t
our simple result that periods of abnormally high trade-volumes witness more cooperation
(lower equilibrium tariﬀs). We may add here that this result is directly comparable to the
one in Bagwell and Staiger since, as in their paper, the dynamics of managed trade here is
driven completely by the initial surge in import-volume.32
30 This inequality holds at any ﬁxed tariﬀsa n dn o tj u s ta tt h ef r e et r a d ei m p o r t - v o l u m e .
31 W em a yn o t eh e r et h a ti tw i l ls u ﬃce for our result here if the no-defection condition binds strictly at c2n
only so that tc(c2n) > 0.
32 That is, there is no direct eﬀect of a change in cn on the deviation payoﬀ. This point has already been
23We now proceed to the next section where we consider some extensions of the model so
far.
Section 3: Extensions
In this section we put forward some extensions of the results derived above. We focus
squarely on tariﬀs alone in sub-sections 3.1 to 3.3 while in 3.4 we allow for export policies
in addition to tariﬀs. Throughout the section we will assume that the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the repeated game exists and that δ is suﬃciently small so that the no-defection
condition is binding.33
3.1 Shocks in import-competing sectors
Consider i.i.d. shocks in the value of cm which is the unit and marginal cost of producing
the importable in each country. Since the static game here is the same as in section 2, global
eﬃciency requires free trade and, the deviation payoﬀ is given by the same Ω(.) function as
above.
























Interpreting the equation we note that since tn >t c, Ω(.) is increasing in cm if and only
if the integrand is positive. The ﬁrst term of the integrand is the terms-of-trade eﬀect with
respect to cm and is strictly positive since dV f/dcm > 0 (Lemma 1) This increases home’s
deviation payoﬀ. The second term is the mark-up eﬀect here and it is strictly negative which
discussed above.
33 For parameter values when this does not hold we get free trade as the equilibrium outcome so that the
issue of the dynamic structure of managed trade is irrelevant.
24is evident from Lemma 1. It is slightly diﬀerent from the one with shocks in cn because, unlike
cn, changes in cm have a direct eﬀect on the deviation payoﬀ also (i.e. the ∂µf/∂cm term). It
can be checked that the integrand is negative if and only if the mark-up eﬀect dominates the
terms-of-trade eﬀect in absolute value; or, equivalently, β(1+m+n)2 >n m [(1+m)2−mn].
Thus, we get a similar result as above that a surge in import-volume due to a higher value
of cm implies a lower deviation payoﬀ and lower equilibrium tariﬀs when the enforcement
constraint is binding if and only if the previous inequality holds.
3.2 Demand side shocks
We now consider i.i.d. shocks in the value of α. That is, periodic shocks in each country’s







x/∂t)dV f/dα +( ∂Xm/∂t)
h
(∂µf/∂V f)dV f/dα + ∂µf/∂α
i
dt
The ﬁrst term in the integrand is the terms-of-trade eﬀect while the second term is mark-
up eﬀect with respect to α. It is straightforward to check that both these terms are strictly
positive. That is, holding tariﬀs ﬁxed, a higher demand implies larger import-volume and
higher mark-up for each country as stated in Lemma 1. Thus, the deviation payoﬀ is strictly
increasing in α. Consequently, we get that with demand side shocks, periods of high trade-
volumes feature higher tariﬀs along the equilibrium path when the enforcement constraint is
binding.
The contrasting results with supply and demand side shocks suggest while predicting the
dynamic pattern of equilibrium tariﬀs vis-a-vis underlying import-volumes, it is important
to draw a distinction between these two types of shocks.
3.3 Interior solution conditions
25We assumed in the sections above that each country’s export-ﬁrms are more eﬃcient
than the import-competing ﬁrms in the other country. That is, cn <c m. It can be checked
that our main result about the dynamic structure of managed trade will continue to hold if
this were replaced by a weaker assumption that: α >m a x {cn+(cn−cm)m,cm−(cn−cm)n}
which is consistent with cn ≥ cm. The main diﬀerence that would arise under this assumption
is that global eﬃciency may require strictly positive tariﬀs. The intuition for this is that
with cn >c m, a small (strictly) positive tariﬀ will shift production away from ineﬃcient
export-ﬁrms to the eﬃcient import-competing ﬁrms. While overall world output of the non-
numeraire good will fall which will tend to lower global welfare as discussed above, however,
the beneﬁt from the shift from ineﬃcient to eﬃcient suppliers may increase global welfare on
the net. However, when the enforcement issue is relevant so that the no-defection condition
is binding then the pattern of managed trade is completely determined by the dynamic
structure of the deviation payoﬀ and global eﬃciency conditions are irrelevant then.34
3.4 Export subsidies and taxes
We complete our analysis with this last extension to include export policies. We maintain
here that countries cooperate over tariﬀs alone and export subsidies (positive or negative)
are set in a unilateral fashion. Also, assume that all our solution values are strictly interior
as this will hold in our ﬁnal equilibrium under Assumption A1.
Using home’s welfare function stated above and treating t,t∗,e ∗ as ﬁxed, we get home’s
best response (export) subsidy as equal to
34 We note that if cm is suﬃciently smaller than cn then global eﬃciency may require autarky. It can be
checked that in this case the static Nash equilibrium will also feature autarky so that cooperation in trade
policy is irrelevant.
26e(t∗) ≡ (tR − t∗)(1 + m − n)/2n
where tR is home’s prohibitive tariﬀ when e,e∗ are equal to zero. By symmetry, foreign’s
best response export subsidy is given by e∗(t)=e(t).
Home’s marginal beneﬁt function with respect to t is given by
wt = V (−∂pw
x/∂t)+t∂V/∂t + µx∂Xm/∂t
where all variables on RHS of the equation are evaluated at arbitrarily given e,e∗,t ∗ values.
Setting wt =0and solving for t we get home’s best response tariﬀ as a function of e∗.
Let this be denoted by t(e∗).35 It can be checked that this is independent of home’s subsidy
since markets for X,Y are segmented. Using these best response tariﬀs we can solve for the
s y m m e t r i cs t a t i cN a s he q u i l i b r i u mv a l u e so ft,e. Let these be denoted by ¯ tn,e n respectively.
The expressions for these are stated in Appendix A3 from which it can be checked that the
solution is unique, non-prohibitive and implies strictly positive values of all the endogenous
variables.
Since there is no cooperation over subsidies, these must be at their unilaterally optimal
levels in equilibrium. Thus, for the rest of the sub-section we set e = e(t∗) and e∗ = e(t).
Next we note a simple stability property which is that an exogenous change in the value of
t implies that t and t − e∗(t) change in the same direction.
Sources of gains from cooperation over tariﬀs are exactly the same as in the previous











35 Expression for t(e
∗) is stated in Appendix A3.
27where the partial derivative on RHS of the previous equation implies that t∗,e,e ∗ are treated
as ﬁxed. From the stability property stated above and that ∂(W + W∗)/∂t<0 as noted in
section 2, we have that global welfare is strictly decreasing in home’s tariﬀ. By symmetry,
the same holds with respect to t∗. Thus, symmetrically lowering both the tariﬀsf r o mt h e i r
static Nash equilibrium levels improves the welfare of both the countries. This implies that
cooperative eﬀort seeks to implement the lowest possible symmetric tariﬀ subject to the
relevant no-defection condition.
The pattern of managed trade can now be easily inferred from the dynamic structure
of the deviation payoﬀ. To this end, consider i.i.d. shocks in the value of cn as in section
2. Let tc(cn) denote the symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium tariﬀ function of the game.
Since home’s best response subsidy is independent of its own tariﬀ, optimal deviation from
an initial tariﬀ agreement features home raising its tariﬀ from tc to t(ec) where ec = e(tc) is
foreign’s subsidy level along the equilibrium path. Thus, home’s deviation payoﬀ is equal to
R t(ec)
tc wtdt.

































Consider the previous equation. The ﬁrst term of the integrand is the terms-of-trade
eﬀect here while the second one captures the mark-up eﬀect. The only diﬀerence here from
section 2 is that these eﬀects now depend on the movement in the optimal subsidy. That is,
holding tc ﬁxed, a change in cn alters the best response subsidy by ∂e∗(.)/∂cn. This change
has a second order eﬀect only on home’s welfare since the subsidy is set optimally to begin
with. However, the revision in the subsidy alters home’s marginal beneﬁt function with
28respect to t (i.e. wt function). Speciﬁcally, it changes the underlying import-volume by an
amount equal to the second term in the ﬁrst square bracket and the underlying mark-up in
home’s import-competing sector by an amount equal to the second term in the second square
bracket. These changes in import-volume and mark-up are in addition to the direct eﬀect of
cn on them which are captured by the ﬁrst terms in the two square brackets, respectively,
a n da r et h es a m ea si ns e c t i o n2 .I tc a nb ee a s i l yc h e c k e dt h a tt h e s et w oe ﬀects are competing
eﬀects so that the overall change in the deviation payoﬀ depends on the relative strength of
terms-of-trade eﬀect and the mark-up eﬀect. Substituting for the terms in previous equation
w eg e tt h a talower value of cn reduces the deviation payoﬀ if and only if n>(1 + m)2/m
while at the same time each country observes an increase in its underlying import volume.
This implies that in periods of abnormally high import-volumes will feature lower equilibrium
tariﬀs when the previous inequality holds.36
This completes our discussion on the extensions of the model. Out basic result is that
with imperfect competition, the pattern of managed trade depends on the dynamic structure
of equilibrium price-cost mark-ups and, under the conditions highlighted above, periods of
unusually high trade-volumes feature greater cooperation (lower tariﬀs).
Conclusion
The paper attempts to extend the work of Bagwell and Staiger (1990) to imperfectly
competitive markets. We have shown that the pattern of managed trade with imperfect
competition is qualitatively diﬀerent from the one when all markets are perfectly competitive.
36 It is simple to check that wt is strictly decreasing in t so that the deviation payoﬀ and the most cooperative
symmetric tariﬀ in the repeated game will move in the same direction when the enforcement constraint is
binding.
29This result was explained by the mark-up eﬀect identiﬁed in the paper. We now put forward
a simple generalization of the mark-up eﬀect to other forms of domestic distortions and
suggest some possible extensions of the model.
Consider an economy where all markets are perfectly competitive and there are output
related positive external economies of scale in the import-competing sector. While private
marginal cost and beneﬁt must be equal to each other in equilibrium, however, absent policy
intervention, the social marginal beneﬁt from the production of the importable will not be
equal to the social marginal cost in the sector. The argument is well known in the literature
leading to a second-best role of import tariﬀs to correct for this distortion (the infant industry
argument). The structure is similar to the presence of mark-ups in our model above with
the diﬀerence that we need to appropriately deﬁne mark-ups here as “social mark-ups”.
Clearly, the size of these social mark-ups will depend on the underlying demand-supply
conditions and, in particular, on the underlying trade-volume giving rise to the mark-up
eﬀect as identiﬁed in this paper. Implication of this for the theory of managed trade can be
developed along the lines of this paper. We would like to mention here that it is diﬃcult
to say aprioi exactly what the direction of the relationship between trade-volumes and the
size of these social mark-ups will be, however, this can be explored once the speciﬁcs of the
model are known. We believe that, under appropriate conditions, the results of this paper





m = m(α − cm − βV f)/β(1 + m), (ii) px =






(iii) Using equation (2) from section 1 set ∂W/∂t =0and solve for t to get the solution value
as
tn =
(1 + m + n)/n
n +2 ( 1+m)2
h
(1 + m)βV f + mnµf
i
=
(1 + 2m)α + m(m − n)cm +[ mn − (1 + m)2]cn
n +2 ( 1+m)2
(iv) Properties of Ω(.) function
From section 1, equation (2), we have that:
W0(V f,µ f,t)=
(1 + m)βV f + mnµf
β(1 + m + n)
−
n[n +2 ( 1+m)2]
β(1 + m + n)2 t.
Using the previous equation, noting the deﬁnition of Ω(.) from section 2 and tn from part
(iii) above, we get that
Ω(.,tc)=
[(1 + m)βV f + mnµf](tn − tc)
β(1 + m + n)
−
n[n +2 ( 1+m)2](t2
n − t2
c)
2β(1 + m + n)2
It is straightforward to note from this that Ω(.) is convex in tc. Further, dΩ(.)/dtc < 0
∀tc ∈ [0,t n) and it is equal to zero at tc = tn. Lastly, dΩ(.)/dtc > 0 ∀tc ∈ (tn,t R], and
Ω(.,tc = tn)=0 .
Appendix A2: Free trade is globally eﬃcient
From section 2 we have that:∂(W +W∗)/∂t =( px −cm)∂X/∂t+(cm −cn)∂V/∂t, where the
partial derivatives indicate that foreign’s tariﬀ is held ﬁxed. Note that both the terms on
31RHS of the equation are strictly negative with cm >c n. Given the symmetric nature of the
model, it follows that lowering tariﬀs symmetrically towards zero increases welfare of both
the countries.
Q.E.D.
Appendix A3: Static Nash equilibrium values with export subsidies:
The best response tariﬀ and subsidy for the home country, denoted by t(e∗),e(t∗), respec-
tively, are: t(e∗)=tn+
(1 + m)2 − mn
n +2 ( 1+m)2 e∗, where tn is as above; e(t∗)=( tR−t∗)(1+m−n)/2n.
Solving the previous two equations simultaneously we get the symmetric static Nash equilib-
rium values of t,e, as equal to ¯ tn,e n, respectively which are as follows: ¯ tn = λtn +( 1− λ)tR
where λ ≡
2n
2n + λ1(1 + m − n)
, λ1 ≡
(1 + m)2 − mn
n +2 ( 1+m)2 . It can be easily checked that λ > 0.
For the export subsidy we have that: en =( 1+m−n)λ(tR−tn)/2n. It can be easily checked
that the Nash equilibrium values of tariﬀs and export subsidies imply that the volume of
trade is strictly positive.
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